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During economic crises, governments often increase fiscal spending to stimulate the economy. 
While the fiscal spending surge is sometimes temporary, recessions are opportunities to revise 
the spending composition often in favor of expenditures in social programs and other public 
goods which tend to persist over time. We model and measure the impact of fiscal spending 
patterns on the environment. The model predicts that a reallocation of government spending 
composition towards public goods reduces pollution while increasing total government spending 
has an ambiguous effect on pollution.  We find consistent empirical results for various air and 
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In most countries, a large fraction of the national income is directly spent by the 
government. Government spending varies from 20% to 45% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 
Many governments expand and revise fiscal spending priorities to stimulate the economy during 
deep economic crises. While the increased government spending may be temporary, the changes 
in the composition of fiscal spending are likely permanent.
1 Given the importance and the 
economic impact of the level and composition of fiscal spending for most areas of the economy 
it is surprising that the connection between fiscal spending policy and the environment has not 
yet been addressed in a systematic manner.   
This article fills this gap in the literature by developing a theoretical and empirical model 
of the mechanisms by which the level and composition of fiscal spending may affect certain air 
and water pollutants.  Given the enormous variety of items in which governments spend, it is 
important to develop a taxonomy of expenditures that is both simple enough to be theoretically 
and empirically tractable and at the same time conceptually meaningful. We use a taxonomy 
proposed by López and Galinato [López and Galinato, 2007] which distinguishes between 
government expenditures that are directed to areas where the private sector under-invests as a 
consequence of market failure, and government expenditures that cannot be justified on these 
grounds. The former can be referred to as “expenditures in public goods” and the latter as 
                                                 
1 The share of expenditures in health care, education, energy and environmental protection in total government 
outlays in the USA is projected to rise from 27% in 2008 to 31% in 2014 as a consequence of the new fiscal policies 
implemented to mitigate the most recent financial crisis [Office of Management and Budget, 2009]. Similarly, 
almost all affected countries during the 1997 Asian crisis made drastic changes in the fiscal spending composition 
which subsequently became permanent. In Korea, fiscal spending in social security and welfare increased from 7.8% 
of the total government expenditures in years prior to the 1997 Asian crisis to 9.7% during the crisis and averaged 
13.5% by 2003-2005, several years after the crisis subsided [Asian Development Bank.,2009].  Social security and 
welfare expenditures in Thailand rose from less than 4% of the government outlays in the pre-crisis years to 6% 
during the crisis and accounted for almost a 9% average in 2003-2005. Many social programs in both advanced and 
developing countries were established in response to deep crises and remained in place for many years thereafter. 
For example, massive conditional cash transfer programs in Mexico emerged in the aftermath of the Peso crisis of 
1995 and still remain in place today.  Similarly, several social security programs which emerged during the Great 
Depression in the USA became a permanent and important component of government spending.                
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“expenditures in private goods.”  The key distinction between expenditures in public goods and 
expenditures in private goods is that the former may alleviate the negative effects of market 
failure, while the latter may not. 
We develop a stylized theoretical model that provides testable predictions for the 
relationship between government spending allocation and the environment using the above 
taxonomy. We then empirically test such predictions for air and water pollutants using a large 
panel data set on pollutant concentrations measured in a large number of monitoring sites 
spanning across many countries over several years.
2     
 We broadly define government expenditures in public goods to include direct subsidies 
to households (education, health and other social transfers), expenditures in conventional public 
goods, environmental protection, research and development (R&D), and knowledge diffusion.  
These expenditures may mitigate the effects of market failure and complement rather than 
substitute private spending. Direct household subsidies diminish the impact of liquidity 
constraints often affecting a large number of households as a consequence of credit market 
imperfections [Attanasio et. al., 2008; Grant, 2007; Jappelli, 1990; Zeldes, 1989] and subsidize 
education and health investments which tend to have large positive externalities [Miguel and 
Kremer, 2004; Moretti, 2004; Moretti, 2004b, Watson, 2006]. Thus, direct household subsidies 
may ameliorate the tendency to under-invest in education and other forms of knowledge by 
households [López et. al., 2008]. Similarly, spending in R&D and knowledge diffusion 
subsidizes activities which are often affected by considerable market failures [Hoff and Stiglitz, 
2000]. Also, environmental protection is an area where the private sector has little incentives to 
invest as a consequence of market failures [Dasgupta, 1996]. Finally, conventional public goods 
                                                 
2 We neither model nor measure the determinants of budget composition. Interested readers may refer to a number 
of studies that have investigated such a relationship [Beasley and Coate, 1998; Cremer et. al,2008; Dreher and 
Sturm, 2008; Gemmell and Kneller, 2008].  
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such as institutions and law and order are considered to be essential areas of investment for the 
government as the private sector does not have incentives to invest in them at optimal levels 
[Polinsky and Shavell, 2000; , Williamson, 2000].   
Expenditures in private goods tend to exacerbate the distortions caused by market failure. 
They include subsidies to fossil fuel production, input subsidies, subsidies to energy 
consumption, farm programs, commodity-specific subsidy programs, government grants to 
corporations, and other subsidies targeting specific industries or firms. In fact, many studies have 
shown that government expenditures in private goods are largely ineffective in promoting 
productivity and private investment and tend to substitute rather than complement private 
expenditures [Bergstrom, 1998; Bregman et. al., 1999; Estache, 1995; Fakin, 1995; Harris, 1991; 
Lee, 1996]. Moreover, any increase of spending in private goods causes a reduction of spending 
in public goods given a fiscal budget constraint.     
  The reallocation of government spending towards public goods may affect pollution via 
the proximate factors similar to those identified in the trade and environment literature 
[Antweiler et. al., 2001]: scale, composition, and technique effects. López and Islam [2008] 
showed that restructuring government spending in favor of public goods causes more economic 
growth. This means that such a restructuring may cause a scale effect which should increase 
environmental pressures, ceteris paribus. On the other hand, this reallocation of government 
spending may favor human capital-intensive activities to the detriment of physical capital-
intensive industries, which tend to be among the most polluting industries [Antweiler et. al, 
2001; Mani and Wheeler, 1997]. Thus, a reallocation from expenditures in private goods to 
public goods causes an output composition effect that is likely to improve environmental quality.  
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  Government expenditures in public goods may also induce a technique effect that could 
be pro-environment. The technique effect refers to a reduction in the pollution-output ratio. A 
greater provision of public goods is associated with higher labor efficiency due to increased 
human capital. To the extent that human capital and pollution-generating dirty inputs are 
substitutes in production, we can expect that a greater provision of human capital would induce 
cleaner production that reduce the pollution-output ratio.  Also, more R&D and technological 
diffusion through expenditures in public goods could lead to the development and use of cleaner 
technologies under certain conditions. In addition, expenditures in public goods can also induce 
an income effect where increased income raises the population’s demand for cleaner 
environment and more environmental regulation, which in turn may reduce pollution.    
  The theoretical analysis shows the conditions under which the reallocation of government 
spending from private goods to public goods may result in lower pollution-output intensity and 
lower total production-generated pollution.
3 It turns out that these conditions are sufficiently 
weak and plausible to allow us to hypothesize that this may indeed be the case.   We empirically 
test this hypothesis and find that increasing the government share of expenditure in public goods 
reduces certain production-generated air and water pollutants, holding aggregate GDP constant.  
Moreover, we also show that expanding total fiscal spending is neutral for the environment.  
Our results are potentially very significant especially given that the U.S. and other 
governments are using fiscal stimulus to mitigate the current economic crisis and address certain 
structural long term problems, including reducing the dependence on fossil fuels, widening 
access to health care, improving education, and reducing poverty through social programs. This 
may entail a major shift in the composition of fiscal expenditures towards these areas, which 
                                                 
3 It must be noted that we focus our analysis on production pollution only and not consumption-generated pollution. 
The mechanisms by which government expenditure size and composition affect consumption pollution is likely to 
differ compared to production pollution.  
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roughly correspond to what we call expenditures in public goods. If our central hypothesis that 
shifting the composition of government expenditures reduces pollution is empirically 
corroborated, then it could mean that achieving environmentally sustainable growth in a 
renovated fiscal context could be much less costly than currently believed.  Also, if aggregate 
government expenditure has no significant impact on the environment, then the current fiscal 
spending surge may not necessarily be deleterious to the environment.         
Despite the large number of studies that have used various specifications to derive the 
structural determinants of pollution, we know of only one study that empirically looks at one 
particular aspect of fiscal policy focusing on only one pollutant.  Using an ad-hoc empirical 
model, Bernauer and Koubi [2006] estimate the effect of the aggregate level of fiscal 
expenditures on sulfur dioxide air concentrations but neglects the role of fiscal spending 
composition.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 formulates the theoretical 
model. Section 3 presents the empirical model. Section 4 describes the data used in the paper. 
Section 5 summarizes the results of the empirical analysis. Section 6 concludes the study. 
2. The Conceptual Model 
The conceptual model captures three important stylized facts. First, production pollution 
is mostly generated by the industrial sector (which includes manufacturing, mining, agriculture 
and related industries), while the service and human capital-producing sectors are relatively 
clean [Mani and Wheeler, 1997]. Second, the industrial sector (henceforth called the “dirty 
sector”) is more capital-intensive and fossil fuel-intensive than the service sector (henceforth 
called the “clean sector”) and the human capital-producing sector (henceforth called the 
“knowledge sector”) [Antweiler et. al., 2001].  Finally, while government expenditures in private  
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goods can target any of the three sectors, most of them are often directed to the industrial sector [ 
López and Islam, 2008].  
Consistent with the above stylized facts the model considers three productive sectors: the 
clean sector (yc), the dirty sector (yd), and the knowledge sector which produces an intermediate 
good called human capital (h). Human capital is an input in the production of all three sectors 
and augments labor efficiency measured by hli where li is raw labor in the i
th sector and h is 
assumed to be greater than 1. Thus hli is effective labor (in efficiency units) used by sector i. The 
dirty sector also uses private capital (k) and a dirty input, e.g. fossil fuel, which is the source of 
production pollution (Z). All three productive sectors benefit from government-provided goods. 
The government spends part of its budget, G, in public goods (g), which are generally 
complementary with private inputs, and in private goods (x) that may be perfect substitutes to 
private capital. The government budget is G=g+x.  
Consumers derive utility from the consumption of final goods and suffer disutility from 
pollution such that the utility function is specified as u(c)-v(Z) where c is per capita consumption. 
Aggregate consumption isCN c    where N is the total number of consumers. Without loss of 
generality, we assume N=1 so thatCc   assuming a fixed population.       
2.1. Assumptions and Functional Forms 
Assumptions: 
A1. The economy is small and open which freely trades in the international markets for final 
goods implying exogenous output prices, and all domestic factor and output markets are 
perfectly competitive.    
A2. By their very nature, the government-provided public goods, such as institutions, 
infrastructure and education, are difficult to allocate to specific sectors, so we assume that they  
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benefit all sectors of the economy but allow for differing productivity effects on each sector. By 
contrast, government expenditures in private goods can be directed to specific sectors. Based on 
the third stylized fact, we assume that all government expenditures in private goods go to the 
dirty sector and that such goods are perfect substitutes with private physical capital.      
A3. We define the  output elasticities of g in the clean sector and dirty sector as   and, 
respectively. We assume that ≥.  
A4. The utility function is increasing and concave in c such that u’(c)>0 and u’’(c)<0 and the 
elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption, a(c) -cu’’(c)/u’(c),  is greater or equal to 1. 
Assumption A3 may a priori seem arbitrary. However, under certain conditions we show 
that this assumption can be empirically tested and is supported by the empirical analysis. 
Assumption A4 is solidly based on empirical evidence. Majority of the vast volume of empirical 
measurements of a(c) in many countries around the world have obtained values above. We 
tabulate a summary of the studies that estimate a(c) across different countries in Table AI in the 
appendix.  
To reduce algebraic clutter and to increase the clarity of the results, we use Cobb-
Douglas production functions.
4 The clean sector’s production function uses human capital, labor 
(lc) and the government-provided public input such that the production function is: 
( 1 )        cc y Ahl g
  , 
where A is the total factor productivity index and   >0 is a parameter representing the output 
elasticity of g in the clean sector.
5  
                                                 
4 This functional form is commonly used in the literature. Most results and all the ensuing theoretical predictions 
that we test in the empirical analysis are still valid if we use general neo-classical production functions instead of the 
Cobb-Douglas function. The use of Cobb-Douglas functional forms merely sharpens the results. Proof is available 
from the authors upon request.     
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The dirty sector  uses (quasi-fixed) physical capital, human capital, two variable inputs, 
namely labor (ld,) and the dirty input which can be pollution itself,
6 the government-provided 
public good  and government-provided private good. The production function is: 
( 2 )       
1  () ( ) dd y Dh l Z x k g
      , 
where D is a total factor productivity index and α>0, β>0, α + β < 1, and >0 is the output 
elasticity of g in the dirty sector.  
Production of human capital uses labor (lr), human capital, and the government-provided 
public good such that the production function can be presented as    () r hB h l g
   , where ν,  μ, 
and B are positive parameters. Assuming that ν=1/2, the production function is simplified to:
7 
(3)                                                         r hB l g
  , 
where 
2 BB   and μ 2μ  . Thus, B can be interpreted as a total factor productivity index, and 
>0 is a fixed parameter representing the output elasticity of g in the knowledge sector.  
Finally, we have two additional market clearing conditions. The labor market competitive 
equilibrium is: 
(4)                        cdr Llll  , 
where L is the total supply of labor in the economy which is assumed to be fixed. Equilibrium in 
the economy’s budget implies that the total consumption is equal to the total, 
(5)                                                     dc cp y y   , 
where p is the price of the dirty good and the price of the clean good has been normalized to one.      
                                                                                                                                                             
5 We could allow the clean sector to also use physical capital, but as long as this sector is less physical capital-
intensive than the dirty sector the qualitative results are not affected. The algebra would however be more complex 
subtracting from the clarity of the presentation.   
6 Representing pollution as an input in production is quite common in the literature. See, for example, Baumol and 
Oates [1988] and Copeland and Taylor [1994].  
7 Assuming ν=1/2 reduces simplifies the algebra but does not alter the qualitative results. This also yields a reduced-
form production function for h which is linearly homogenous in private inputs.  
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Producers in the dirty sector minimize the cost of production by choosing labor, and the 
dirty input, Z, given g, h, x and k, 
(6)  
1- -
() , ( , ; , , ) min :            ( )
d
dd d d hl Z Cw y k xg w h l Z Dh l Z x k g y
        , 
where w is the wage rate per unit of efficiency labor (hld) and τ is the unit tax rate on pollution. 
We note that since w is the wage rate per efficiency labor units the actual wage rate per unit of 
labor time is hw.
8  
The implicit cost function in (6) is 
( 7 )             
1 1
  d Cw yx k g
  
       
 
     , 
where 
1
=D ( / ) (1 / )

    

  . Using Shepherd’s Lemma, the dirty input demand is, 
(8)        
11 1
 D( / )( / ) d
C
Zw y x k g
  
           

  




2.2. Competitive equilibrium 
We derive the equilibrium levels for the relevant endogenous variables w, yd, yc and.  
The assumption of competitive equilibrium means that the marginal value products of labor in all 
three sectors equalize.  Equating the marginal products of labor in the clean sector and 
knowledge sector using (1) and (3) yield unique equilibrium levels for h and w consistent with 
competitive labor markets:
9 
(9)                 
μ- B
h =  g
A
 ,    
(10)                 wA g
  .  
                                                 
8 Firms choose ld taking hw as given.  Equivalently, we can regard firms picking the level of efficiency labor hld (by 
selecting ld ) with reference to the wage for efficiency effort, w, as we do in (6).     
9 In deriving (9) we used the fact that the marginal product of raw labor in the human capital producing sector is 
equal to the wage rate per unit of raw labor time, hw. Thus, using (3) we have that h/lr= Bg
=hw. Then using (1) 
we have yc/(hlc)= Ag
=w which combined with the previous equation leads to (9).     
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Thus, from (10) the equilibrium wage rate per efficiency labor is increasing in the government-
provided public good. Moreover, the level of human capital is non-decreasing in the 
government-provided public good if  ≥ . This latter result is plausible; the direct positive 
effect of increasing expenditures in public goods on human capital dominates the indirect 
negative effect associated with the increased wage rate per efficiency labor.  
A competitive economy behaves as if it maximizes its total output revenue subject to the 
economy remaining on the production possibility frontier. This maximization yields the 
equilibrium level of the dirty output, yd. To derive the production possibility frontier, we 
substitute the demand for labor from each sector into the labor constraint (4).  Using (9) in (1), 
(2) and (3), we obtain expressions for c l , d l  and r l , respectively. Using these expressions in (4) the 
labor market clearing condition can be written as a function of yc and yd,  
(11)    
11 1 ()
 // ( / ) ( ) cd Lg A y g B y DA B Zx k g
    
    
   
      . 
The economy’s total revenue, pyd + yc, is maximized with respect to yd and yc subject to (11) and 










(12)    







yD A B Z x k g y
p
yg B
     
   









Solving (12) we obtain an explicit expression for yd, 
(13)    
11
11 1 1 (/ )  ( ) d yp D AD Z x k g
    
    
  
    . 
Using (11) and (13) the equilibrium level of yc can also be obtained.   
 
12
We now turn to the determination of. The optimal pollution tax rate or optimal tax-
equivalent pollution regulation is equal to the marginal rate of substitution between income and 
pollution [ López, 1994], 





  . 
Recall that v(Z) is the disutility from pollution. We assume that v is linear and increasing in Z 
such that v’(Z).
10  
We distinguish between the optimal pollution tax rate (or the optimal tax-equivalent 
regulation) that fully internalizes the production pollution costs, 
*, and the actual pollution tax 
rate (or tax-equivalent pollution regulation) chosen by the government,.  Depending on 
institutional and social conditions, the government may choose a level of  below the optimal tax 
rate, *.  We assume that the actual pollution tax rate is proportional to the optimal tax, =(I)
*, 
where 1 and I is a vector of politico-institutional conditions that may affect the effectiveness 
of the environmental policy.  Finally, using (5) and evaluating yc and yd  at their respective 
equilibrium values yields the actual pollution tax rate, 











2.3. The Effect of Increasing the Budget Share of Government Expenditures in Public Goods  
We now derive the effect on pollution from an increase in expenditures in public goods 
that is entirely financed through a concomitant reduction of expenditures in private goods. This 
corresponds to increasing the budget share of expenditures in public goods given a fixed 
government budget.  Using x = G-g, logarithmic differentiation of (8) with respect to g yields,  
                                                 
10 If  () vZ is strictly convex instead of linear, the ensuing results are reinforced.  
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(16)      
ln ln 1 ln (1 ) ln
 
ln ln ln ( ) ln
d
g
y dZ w d
dg g g dg
    

   
  
    
     






 is the ratio of the government-provided public good over the total capital used 
by the private sector.  
Equation (16) decomposes the impact of a change in the composition of government 
expenditures towards public expenditures on pollution into five partial effects: First, the direct 
effect is negative. This implies that the same level of the dirty output can be produced with fewer 
dirty inputs when g increases holding all other factors constant. Second is the dirty output scale 
effect. A higher g  increases labor productivity which, in turn, may affect the level of the dirty 
output holding all other factors constant. The dirty output level does not necessarily increase 
because a rise in g increases labor productivity in all sectors of the economy not just the dirty 
sector. If this effect causes production of the dirty output to increase (decrease), this effect will 
be pollution-increasing (decreasing).  Third is the pollution-labor substitution effect. A higher g 
raises the economy’s wage rate which increases pollution since labor and pollution are 
substitutes. Fourth is the government’s budget effect. An increase in g reduces x which implies a 
lower level of total capital used in production. Given a constant output level, the fall in total 
capital must be compensated with an increase in all variable inputs including pollution. Fifth is 
the environmental regulation effect. An increase in g leads to higher income which induces a 
higher pollution tax and reduces pollution, ceteris paribus.  
We can now derive the total impact of g on Z and  d y by using (10), (13), (15) and (16), 
(17)       
















(18)     













where c  yc
*/(yc
*+pyd




the share of dirty output in total income such that cd 1    . The first term on the right-hand of 
(17) condenses the direct effect, the pollution-labor substitution effect, part of the dirty output 
scale effect that accounts for the change in yd keeping x constant and the environmental 
regulation effect. The second right-hand-term in (17) incorporates the effect of the fall in dirty 
output caused by a lower level of x, plus the direct government’s budget effect.  
From (17) we derive the fundamental result of this section: the necessary and sufficient 
condition for pollution to be non-increasing in government expenditures in public goods is 
(17’)                               
d
c
(1 ( )(1 ) ) (1 )








   
 
    
. 
Thus, pollution must be decreasing in g as long as assumptions A3 and A4 hold (    and  
a(c)1). More generally, if the output elasticity of g in the clean sector plus the weighted 
government budget effect is larger than the weighted output elasticity of g in the dirty sector then 
pollution is decreasing in share of expenditures in public goods. Even if assumption A3 does not 
hold such that  < , pollution can still be decreasing in the share of expenditure in public goods 
as long as the government’s budget effect is significant. The following proposition then follows, 
Proposition  1. If assumptions A3 and A4 hold, i.e.if      and a(c)1, then increasing 
government expenditures in public goods entirely financed by decreasing expenditures in private 
goods reduces pollution.  
Pollution Intensity 
Using (17) and (18), the effect of  g on the pollution intensity of the dirty output is,  
 
15
 (19)                 
d d
cd






         . 
  Thus, the effect of increasing the fiscal budget share of expenditures in public goods is to 
decrease the pollution intensity of the dirty sector.  We note that unlike the effect on total 
pollution shown above, this unambiguous result is not dependent on assumptions A3 and A4. 
Thus we have the following proposition,  
Proposition 2.  Increasing government-provided public goods financed by a concomitant 
reduction of expenditures in private goods reduces pollution intensity of the dirty sector making 
the dirty sector cleaner.  
2.4. The Effect of Increasing Total Fiscal Spending on Pollution 
We now consider the effect on pollution of an increase in total government spending that 
is financed by government borrowing instead of the effect of expenditure reallocation as we 
derived in the previous section.
11  We examine the effect of a neutral increase in total fiscal 
spending where both g and x are increased by the same proportion.  From (17) it follows that the 
pollution effect of an increase in g holding x constant is, 
(20)                        
[1 ( )(1 ) ( )(1 ) ] [ ( )(1 ) ] ln
ln 1
cc ac ac ac dZ
dg
   






Note that given that    the sign of (20) is negative if the first term in square brackets in the 
numerator is smaller than the second square bracket term. This is true as long as 1 a  .  The 
partial effect of x on pollution can be derived in a similar way as the effect of g, 
(21)                                  
0
ln













                                                 








 is the share of government-provided private goods in total capital used by the 
dirty sector.  
From (20) and (21) we derive the net effect of increasing total fiscal spending keeping the 
spending composition constant, 
(22)                      dc [1 ( )(1 ) ] (1 ) [ ( )(1 ) ] ln
ln 1
x ac ac dZ
dG
    





The net effect of a fiscal spending expansion on pollution is, in general, ambiguous. A neutral 
increase of G raises both g and x by the same proportion. When the share of physical capital in 
the dirty sector (1-α-β) and the share of the government-provided private good in total capital 
(πx) are both small, it is more likely that pollution will be decreasing in total fiscal spending. This 
is intuitively plausible because the partial pollution-increasing effect of the x component of G is 
small in this case. Also, G  is less likely to be pollution increasing when there is greater 
divergence between the output elasticity of the public good in the clean and dirty sectors. If  is 
large and  is small, it is more likely that the pollution-reducing effect of increasing g could off-
set the pollution-increasing effect of increasing x.        
These results are summarized in the following proposition, 
Proposition 3. A borrowing-financed increase in aggregate fiscal spending that keeps the 
expenditure composition constant has an ambiguous effect on pollution. Aggregate fiscal 
spending is more (less) likely to raise pollution when the share of capital in the production of the 
dirty good and the share of the government-provided private goods in the total private capital in 
the dirty sector are high (low) while the divergence between the elasticity of the public good in 
the clean and dirty sectors is small (large).     
In addition we have the following corollary to proposition 3,  
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Corollary to Proposition 3.  An increase in total public spending while keeping expenditure 
composition constant necessarily increases pollution if assumptions A3 and A4 do not hold. 
This Corollary is important because it suggests a way to empirically validate assumptions A3 and 
A4 used elsewhere throughout the theoretical model.   
3. The Empirical Model 
We estimate the effect of government spending on pollution levels by specifying an 
empirical model that controls for various economy-wide factors and uses proxy measures to 
control for the scale effect and (imperfect proxies) for the tax-equivalent pollution regulations. 
The empirical model specification is derived by using Equations (10), (13) and (15) in (8). This 
yields the following specification for an empirical pollution equation,  
 (23)                              F( , , , , , ) Z gxpIkc  . 
We postulate that the vector I that determines the proportional wedge between τ and τ
* 
from (15) is dependent on political economy factors and institutions, Pol, the growth rate of 
GDP, R, and consumption per capita, c. Wealthier countries that are democratic and have more 
efficient political institutions are likely to establish pollution regulations close to the optimal 
pollution tax level, *.  Also, we hypothesize that the speed of economic growth (the growth rate 
of GDP) may have an impact on the ability of regulations to adjust to pollution levels. Countries 
that grow too fast may not have time to adjust environmental regulations to the increasing 
pressures on the environment that economic growth entails. Thus, we postulate that the vector I 
is determined by Pol, R and  c. We also use trade policy (T) as a factor that affects the relative 
price,  p , as well as productivity [Melitz, 2003].   
Using these considerations and after dividing and multiplying g and x  by  G, where 
Gg+x, and then normalizing G by the economy’s income, we obtain the following,  
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(23’)      F( ,1 , , , , , , ) Z ss G T P o l R k c   , 
where  sg/G is the share of government expenditures in public goods in total government 
expenditure and  / GG c    is total government expenditure in total income of the economy.  
 From (23’), we derive the following empirical relationship: 
 (24)  12 4356 78 ln ln ln ln ln ln ln ijt jt jt jt jt jt jt jt jt ij t ijt ZsGY T P o l Rkc                ,  
where subscript i, j and t represents site station where pollution is monitored, country and time, 
respectively and j (j=1,..,8) are fixed parameters. Thus Zijt is pollution concentration measured 
from site i in country j at year t;  jt s  is the share of public goods expenditure in total government 
expenditure in country  j at time t;  jt G  is government consumption expenditure over GDP;
12 Tjt 
is an index of trade policy openness; Yjt is total GDP per land area;  Poljt is a vector of political 
economy variable that include an index of democracy, years of democratic stability and a 
dummy for freedom of press; Rjt is GDP growth rate; kjt is the share of investment over GDP (as 
a proxy for capital stock); cjt is the household income per capita;  ij  is a site effect corresponding 
to site i in country  j which can be fixed or random, t is a time effect common to all countries, 
and  ijt  is a random disturbance with the usual desirable properties.    
  We test two parts of our theoretical model: Proposition 1 and the corollary to Proposition 
3. For Proposition 1 to hold, 1 needs to be negative and significant. For the corollary to 
proposition 3 to hold, 2 needs to be non-positive. 
3.1. Interpretation issues 
                                                 
12 We use total government consumption since government investment is already included in the share of investment 
over GDP. Thus we avoid double counting.  
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The theoretical model used to derive the empirical model is relevant for production-
generated pollution so we focus on air pollutants generated as a by-product from production as 
opposed to consumption of goods. We calculate the percentage distribution of sources of 
pollution by air pollutant type and identify if the majority are from production sources, such as 
electricity generation or industrial processes, or consumption sources, such as road vehicle use 
and residential wood combustion (see Appendix Table AII).  
There are six air pollutants for which there is consistent data on concentrations levels 
measured in several monitoring stations for a number of countries: sulfur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen 
dioxide, lead, ozone, volatile organic compounds and carbon monoxide. Nitrogen dioxide, 
carbon monoxide and volatile organic compounds mainly come from road vehicle use and are 
more likely to be consumption pollutants based on the distribution of sources shown in Table 
AIII.
13 Since the combination of nitrogen dioxide and volatile organic compounds produce 
ozone, ozone can also be considered a consumption pollutant. On the other hand, the majority of 
SO2 and lead come from electricity generation and industrial process. We note that during the 
late 1970s and early 1980s the main source of lead was from road vehicles using leaded gasoline. 
However, by the mid-1980s, lead in gasoline was partially or even totally banned in the majority 
of our sample of countries. The remaining lead concentrations are mainly due to production 
processes within our sample period which starts in the late 1980s. Thus, we focus the study of air 
pollution on SO2 and lead.  
The measure of water pollution used is biological oxygen demand (BOD). The majority 
of BOD emissions come from the food industry (on average 44%) followed by textiles (on 
                                                 
13 In general, emissions from road vehicles may be classified as production-generated or consumption-generated. 
However, majority of vehicles are passenger vehicles so we classify pollutants associated with their use as 
consumption pollution.  
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average 16%) [Gurluk, 2009]. In general BOD  can be regarded as primarily a production-
generated pollutant although a modest fraction of it is originated in consumption processes.   
Since we control for measures of aggregate output and institutional factors as 
determinants of the implemented tax-equivalent pollution regulation,, the coefficients of the 
government spending variables are capturing  the sum of the direct effect, the pollution-labor 
substitution effect  and the government’s budget effect. However, as indicated earlier it is likely 
that the proxies that we use for   are imperfect and incomplete, so we can expect that the 
government variables also capture some of the unobserved environmental regulation effects.  To 
put it in terms of the usual nomenclature used to classify the pollution effects in the trade 
literature, the coefficients of the government expenditure variables mainly capture the output 
composition and input composition effects and part of the technique effect.  
3.2. Econometric issues 
The impact of government expenditure may not occur instantaneously. For this reason, 
we use the lagged share of expenditure in public goods and lagged share of government 
consumption expenditure which also may mitigate bias from reverse causality. However, other 
biases may persist if the lagged values of the government spending variables are correlated with 
omitted variables that affect pollution but which may not be causally related to government 
spending variables. The use of fixed site effects may control for time-invariant omitted variables 
but the problem of time-varying omitted variables remains.   
Omitted time-varying variables could bias the coefficients of the government variables if 
they are correlated with the government spending variables. We are particularly concerned with 
omitted time-varying environmental regulations that are difficult to measure and may be 
positively correlated with expenditures in public goods, which may cause an upward bias to the  
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coefficients of such expenditures. Environmental regulation changes over time are also driven by 
factors other than the government spending variables that may be correlated with the government 
spending variables.  For example, one could speculate that governments that are more responsive 
to social welfare may spend more in public goods and may also be inclined to implement tighter 
environmental regulation leading to lower pollution.  
To deal with this possibility we use time-varying country-specific effects (TVC) as part of 
the sensitivity analysis. We exploit the fact that we have several site observations per country 
and year and, thus we augment equation (24) by substituting the common-to all-countries time 
effect, t , with the TVC effects that allow for country-idiosyncratic time varying effects. That is, 
we use country-year interaction effects or ajt effects.
14 This allows us to control for biases due to 
unobserved economy-wide, time-varying omitted variables that differ for each country. Since 
most of the unobserved environmental regulations apply to the whole country and since the 
government variables are also economy-wide, this procedure should be quite effective in 
removing potential biases affecting the coefficients of the government spending variables.  While 
the TVC procedure prevents biases due to time-varying country specific unobserved variables, it 
may entail costs as a consequence of having to estimate a large number of additional 
parameters.
15 For this reason we use the TVC procedure mainly as a sensitivity analysis to check 
the robustness of the coefficients associated with the government spending variables.          
We also employ a frequently used procedure that can be called Added Controls Approach 
(ACA) to deal with the general issue of time-varying omitted variables.  ACA enhances the 
controls by using a large set of additional institutional, political and economic time-varying 
                                                 
14 Given that Equation (24) already controls for the fixed or random site-country effects ij the additional ajt 
dummies are defined for T  -1 periods where T   is the total number of periods.     
15 Out of a total of 1910 site observations in 38 countries for SO2, we need to estimate 246 additional coefficients 
associated with the ajt dummies. For lead and BOD we estimate 153 and 310 ajt dummies, respectively, using a total 
of 664 observations in 28 countries and 3584 site observations in 40 countries, respectively.   
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control sets in sequence. These added controls may be correlated with unobserved time-varying 
variables that could bias the effect of the government variables.  If a large number of control sets 
are used and the sign and significance of the coefficients of interest do not change, it is less 
likely that time-varying omitted variables affect the estimates. The ACA sensitivity analysis that 
we use follows a procedure used by Altonji et al. [2005], which consists of verifying whether 
adding variables that increase the goodness-of-fit of the estimation affect the coefficients in 
question.              
4. The Data 
Water and air pollution concentration measures are derived from the Global 
Environmental Monitoring System (GEMS) dataset which is the most consistent data source for 
cross-country pollution. The air quality measures were compiled by the WHO Automated 
Meteorological Information System (AMIS) program. In this study, we use only the WHO-
AMIS dataset from 1986 – 1999 for air pollution.
16  
For the case of water quality we are able to use a more updated dataset for the years 
1980-2005 from GEMS-Water. These data are actual measurement of water quality from various 
groundwater, wetland, rivers or lakes in fixed sites. There are 47 countries in our sample that 
measure water quality. For the air pollution data, the total number of countries included in the 
sample is 38 of which half are low and middle income according to the World Bank 
classification. Taking SO2 as an example, there are about 1900 observations distributed in 120 
cities with about 2.5 measurement sites per city per year on average.
   
                                                 
16 The air quality database is sponsored by the World Health Organization (WHO) and maintained by the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) while the water quality database is maintained by GEMSWater. The 
original air quality dataset utilized by Grossman and Krueger [1995] has been updated to GEMS/AIRS resulting in 
two GEMS datasets which were cleaned and combined by Harbaugh et al. [2000] for the years 1971 to 1992. 
However, in their study they do not explicitly explain how they combine the data when both datasets have differing 
observations. Thus, we did not combine the older dataset with the most recent dataset from the WHO.  
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Government expenditures data is obtained from the Government Financial Statistics 
database compiled by the IMF and, in some cases, we use data from the Asian Development 
Bank. Expenditures in public goods include spending in education, health, social welfare, 
transport, communications, public order and safety, research and development, environment, 
recreation and culture, and social housing.
17 We include social welfare as part of the 
expenditures in public goods because it includes housing, unemployment, sickness and disability, 
care for the elderly, survivors, family and children, and R&D for social protection. These social 
welfare programs allow the poor to invest in education and health which corrects 
underinvestment in human capital in part due to credit market imperfections and positive 
spillovers associated with education and health. However, we check the robustness of the results 
to the exclusion of social welfare expenditures from the public good component. Table AIII in 
the appendix presents summary statistics of the data. Data source and descriptions are in Table 
AIV in the appendix. 
5. The Results 
We present Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Fixed Site Effects (FSE), Random Site 
Effects (RSE) and Hausman Taylor Random Site Effects (HTRE) estimates of air and water 
pollutants based on the specification in (23). FSE and RSE models take into consideration the 
heterogeneous characteristics across sites.  The HTRE method allows for some of the 
explanatory variables to be correlated with individual effects [Baltagi et. al., 2003].  
5.1. The Econometric Estimates 
Tables I and II present the coefficient estimates of the determinants of the production-
generated pollutants. The goodness-of-fit of the models are satisfactory as shown by the adjusted 
                                                 
17 One obvious hypothesis to test is the impact of environmental expenditure on pollution concentration. 
Unfortunately, many countries in our sample do not provide values for this subcategory in the data.   
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R-squared and significant coefficients. We use the Huber / White / Sandwich estimator of 
variance to estimate the standard error of the coefficients to account for any potential 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. All estimates yield negative and statistically significant 
effects for the share of public goods regardless of the method used. If these estimates are 
corroborated by the sensitivity analysis, it means that the key prediction of the model in 
Proposition 1 is empirically supported.  Moreover, with the exception of the OLS estimates 
which are likely to be biased, the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients are remarkably similar 
for each of the three pollutants across the three methods of estimation. For SO2 they range 
between -0.36 and -0.44. The ranges for lead and BOD coefficients vary between -0.61 and -0.74 
and -0.21 and -0.26, respectively. We can use any of the estimates that allow for heterogeneous 
site characteristics as a benchmark because government expenditure variables are lagged and, 
therefore, not endogenous. Here, we use the RSE estimates as benchmarks for the sensitivity 
tests and the simulation.
18  
The estimates imply that increasing the share of government expenditures in public goods 
by 10%, holding total government expenditure constant, may result in a 4% reduction of SO2 
concentration and a 7% decrease in lead concentrations. A similar reallocation of government 
expenditures may induce a 2% decrease in BOD. To see the importance of these effects it is 
convenient to look at relative changes within the sample. Increasing the share of expenditures in 
public goods by one standard deviation (about 27% of the sample mean) reduces SO2 
concentrations by 10% of its standard deviation (or 12% of the sample mean), lead by 15% of its 
standard deviation (or 21% of the sample mean), and BOD concentration by 1% of its standard 
                                                 
18 The Hausman test suggests that some of the explanatory variables used in the RSE estimation may be endogenous. 
The test uses random effects as the maintained assumption and tests whether the explanatory variables are truly 
exogenous. Since the government spending variables are lagged, they are not endogenous. Thus, the Hausman test in 
our specification may mainly indicate that some of the control variables that are not lagged are endogenous.    
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deviation (or 6% of the sample mean). Thus, it appears that the quantitative impact of changes in 
the composition of government spending is quite large especially for the air pollutants.    
The size of the government, as measured by the share of total government consumption 
expenditure in GDP, has no significant impact in any of the pollutants in all three estimators that 
allow for heterogeneous site characteristics. In fact, there is a surprising degree of 
correspondence on these results. Thus, changing the total level of government consumption 
expenditure without changing its composition is likely to be pollution neutral. If this finding is 
robust to the ensuing sensitivity analyses it means that by the Corollary to Proposition 3, 
assumptions A3 and A4 used in the theoretical analysis are not jointly rejected by the empirical 
evidence. 
Most of the signs and significance of the coefficients associated with the other controls 
are generally plausible and consistent with the literature. We find that per capita household 
income has a consistent negative and significant effect on water pollution across all methods of 
estimation. For SO2 the household income effect is negative although mostly insignificant in all 
cases except for OLS. For lead the income effect is positive, a result for which we do not have an 
explanation. The literature finds much more definitive and robust income effects [Antweiler et. 
al., 2001] than our estimates. To the extent that government public expenditure share is 
positively correlated with household income [López and Islam, 2008], the omission of the former 
in the regression could bias the income estimates from the literature when the effect of 
government expenditure composition is not controlled for. The output scale effect, represented 
by the GDP per land area variable, is positive and significant in most of the estimates. This is 
quite consistent with studies that have separated the effects of output scale from per capita 
income [Antweiler et. al., 2001; Grossman and Krueger, 1995].   
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The political economy variables generally have a significant negative effect on pollution 
with the exception of freedom of the press and polity for BOD. This is generally consistent with 
the notion that political economy factors may be important in determining the emergence of 
institutions that regulate pollution levels. Particularities of the political system, the degree of 
participation of the civil society in monitoring governments [Dollar and Kray, 2007; Li et. al, 
1998; Lundberg and Squire, 2003; White and Anderson, 2001] and freedom of the press 
[Arimah, 2004; Chong and Grandstein, 2004] are some of the politico-economy factors that 
appear to play a role in improving social welfare and subsequently improving environmental 
quality. 
5.2. Sensitivity Analysis 
The reliability of the reported estimates depend on the assumption that there are no 
underlying time-varying omitted variables, such as institutional development and environmental 
policies that may lead to lower pollution levels and which may be correlated with but not caused 
by the fiscal variables. If we do not control for these variables, spurious correlation between 
pollution and public expenditure may exist. We check the robustness of our results from these 
types of omitted variables by using the ACA and TVC approaches.  
ACA Sensitivity Analysis.  Several studies have found that governance [Barro, 2003], 
government finance [Borensztein et. al., 1995], human capital and income distribution [López et. 
al., 2008], and demographics [Gallup et. al., 1999], are correlated with economic development 
which, in turn, may induce institutional changes that may affect environmental policies. We add 
a set of variables representing each of the determinants listed above in sequence into the RSE 
regressions for each pollutant.   
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Table III shows how the estimated coefficient of lagged share of expenditure in public 
goods on pollution changes as we alternatively add various sets of time-varying control variables 
to the base model. A set of added control variables raises the explanatory power to the basic 
model if the adjusted R-squared increases relative to the base level. Adding the set of variables 
representing human capital and income distribution and the set of government finance variables 
both increase explanatory power for the SO2 model.  Despite this, the sign and significance of the 
lagged share of public goods expenditure coefficients are largely unaffected. For BOD, the 
results are even more robust. All set of covariates, except government finance, adds explanatory 
power to the model. However, even with the inclusion of these sets of variables, the sign and 
significance of our coefficient of interest does not change. The results for lead are not as robust. 
While the government share of public expenditures remains negative in all cases, the coefficient 
becomes insignificant in majority of the cases. A possible reason for the lack of complete 
robustness of the results for lead may be due to the relatively small number of observations that 
are available for this pollutant. 
Similar sensitivity checks were implemented to ascertain the robustness of the finding 
that total government consumption expenditures had non-positive effects on pollution. As shown 
in Table III this result is robust to the sensitivity checks implemented. The coefficient of 
government consumption expenditure is either insignificant or negative and significant for BOD, 
SO2 and lead in all specifications but never positive and significant. 
TVC Sensitivity Analysis.  Table IV presents the TVC estimates using the augmented RSE 
model as well as RSE with fixed country effects for comparison. The coefficient of the share of 
public goods remains significant and negative for all pollutant models in both cases. Since the 
fixed country effect model is nested in the TVC model we can test the former using a Likelihood  
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Ratio (LR) test. As shown in Table IV the LR test rejects the fixed country effect model in favor 
of the TVC at a 1% level of significance. The TVC estimates show that the coefficients of the 
government share of public expenditures remain negative and highly significant for all 
pollutants. While the coefficients for SO2 and lead become larger in absolute magnitude than 
those in the base regressions, the magnitude of the coefficient for BOD is remarkably similar to 
the size of the coefficient estimated with the RSE base model reported in Table II.    
  The coefficient for total government consumption expenditure is consistently 
insignificant for SO2 and BOD. However, the same coefficient is now negative and significant 
for lead when the TVC approach is used. By the Corollary to Proposition 3 this implies that 
assumption A3 and A4 made in the theoretical model are consistent with the empirical findings.    
Dominance Tests.  A test for extreme observation dominance of the share of public goods was 
conducted by estimating the model without the top and bottom 1% of the share of public goods 
expenditure data. A similar analysis was also conducted with the pollutant measures themselves. 
Signs, significance and magnitudes of the parameter estimates from the models are robust as 
shown in Table V. To test for the effect of potential country outliers, we dropped countries one at 
a time if they have less than 5% of the total number of observations and checked whether they 
altered the parameter estimates of the share of public goods. There is no significant country 
dominance.  It appears that the results are not driven by a small number of observations.
19 
Additional Sensitivity checks. We also conduct a series of additional robustness checks related 
to the variables included in the regression analyses. First, the expenditure in social welfare 
category may not all be used to correct underinvestment in human capital. We exclude this 
                                                 
19 We also implement bootstrapping procedures to verify robustness of standard errors and check for country 
dominance to see whether results are driven by a small number of observations. We calculate standard errors using 
nonparametric bootstrap with 10,000 sampling repetitions. Bias-corrected confidence intervals are generated from 
the bootstrap procedure to test the significance of the coefficient of interest. Table V shows the standard error and 
significance level using the bootstrap procedure are very close to the original benchmark.  
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subcategory in the construction of the share of public goods variable and re-estimate the 
regressions. We find that the sign and significance of the share of public goods remains robust in 
the SO2 and BOD regressions but it becomes insignificant for the lead regression as shown in 
Table VI. One potential explanation is that lead pollution may have a disproportionate effect on 
lower income populations who rely on social welfare.  
Second, we include an index of political constraints used in Henisz [2000], an index of 
globalization used in Dreher [2006] and different democracy indicators used in [Cheibub and 
Gandhi, 2010] and find that our results are robust to the addition of these variables across all 
pollutants. We summarize the results in Tables VII and VIII.  
Lastly, we estimated a dynamic panel model with a lagged dependent variable as an 
added regressor in Table IX. Results are also robust for all pollutants.  
5.3 Summary of the Results   
The results render empirical support not only to the main empirically testable prediction of the 
theoretical model shown in Proposition 1 but they are also consistent with the key assumptions 
used by the model as shown in the Corollary to Proposition 3. The finding that shifts in the 
composition of fiscal spending in favor of public goods causes a reduction in pollution is very 
robust for SO2 and BOD.  While the negative effect of public good expenditure share on lead is 
not as robust, the coefficient remains negative in all cases.  
The finding that the effect of total government consumption expenditure is non-positive 
is also robust. In fact, the coefficient associated with the government consumption expenditures 
variable is either insignificant or negative and significant for all three pollutants, but never 
positive and significant. This finding validates two key assumptions made in the theoretical 
model: the output elasticity of public goods in the clean sector is larger than that in the dirty  
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sector and the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption is greater or equal to 1. Thus, the 
theoretical model developed in this paper appears to be robust when its key prediction and 
assumption are confronted with empirical evidence.  
6. Conclusion 
This paper presents the first comprehensive theoretical and empirical examination of the 
effects of the level and composition of fiscal spending on the environment. We have shown that 
reallocating government expenditure towards a greater provision of public goods reduces air and 
water pollution.  An increase in the share of government spending in public goods in total 
government spending decreases significantly the concentration of BOD and SO2 in the 
atmosphere.  These results pass extremely demanding sensitivity tests and do not seem to be 
driven by biases originated in neither fixed nor time-varying omitted variables.  The evidence for 
lead is less robust but it hints at a possible pollution-decreasing effect as well. Another finding is 
that total government spending is neutral for pollution, holding government expenditure 
composition unchanged. An interpretation of this is that when increasing government 
expenditure in public goods and private goods by the same proportion, the pollution-reducing 
effects of increasing the former tends to offset pollution-increasing effects of the latter.  
These results may have important implications given the current emphasis on fiscal 
spending as a means to palliate the effects of the current world economic crisis. It appears that 
many countries, including the USA, have started a program that entails not only increasing 
government spending in a dramatic way but also increasing the emphasis in the expansion of 
public goods, especially social spending including education and health care, along with green 
initiatives.  Given our results, the expansion of government spending with greater emphasis in  
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public goods may have an unexpected silver lining: It could make reducing pollution easier to 
achieve entailing much lower costs than what is usually assumed.    
This implication is particularly important because the source of the effect of government 
spending composition on pollution is not likely to be related to environmental regulation as 
shown by the robustness of the results to time-varying omitted variables related to economy-
wide environmental regulation.  Even if environmental regulation remains unchanged, the 
change in the composition of government spending towards public goods is likely to reduce air 
and water pollution at each level of GDP.         
In closing, we have been able to develop a simple model which is not only powerful 
enough to yield an important empirically testable prediction but also exposes two of its key 
assumptions to empirical falsification. Both the prediction and the theoretical assumption of the 
model are supported by the empirical evidence. Theoretical parsimony and powerful testable 
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Pollution Estimates using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Fixed Site Effects (FSE) 
 
 OLS  FSE 
  Air Water Air Water 
 
Log SO2 Log  Lead  Log 
BOD  
Log SO2 Log  Lead  Log 
BOD 
 
Log Share of expenditures in 
public goods (as %  of total 













[0.100]  [0.177]  [0.041]  [0.079]  [0.112] [0.044] 
             
Log total government cons 
exp over GDP lagged          
0.303**  -1.168***  -0.397***  -0.005  -0.498 0.238 
[0.125]  [0.253]  [0.108]  [0.177]  [0.486] [0.196] 
             
Log total Investment over  
GDP lagged   
0.035  -1.090***  -0.383***  0.162  -0.033 -0.185* 
[0.095]  [0.152]  [0.061]  [0.100]  [0.204] [0.109] 
             
Log Household final 
consumption expenditure per 
capita  (2000 US$) average of 
current and previous two 
years    
0.203***  0.234***  -0.081**  -0.605*  2.032** -0.439** 
[0.033]  [0.064]  [0.032]  [0.344]  [0.909] [0.208] 
             
Log Total GDP (2000 US$) 
over  land area (sq. km) 
0.201***  -0.207***  0.292***  0.923***  0.528 0.583*** 
[0.020]  [0.037]  [0.015]  [0.278]  [0.677] [0.160] 
           
Growth rate of GDP   -1.354**  2.940**  -2.219***  0.636*  1.875* -0.840** 
[0.639]  [1.193]  [0.524]  [0.385]  [1.107] [0.361] 
             
Trade openness Index   -0.001  -0.002  0.008***  0.0005  0.013*** 0.005*** 
[0.001]  [0.002]  [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.004] [0.002] 
             
Dummy Freedom of Press  -0.588***  0.096  0.128**  -0.169***  -0.134 0.118*** 
[0.068]  [0.154]  [0.056]  [0.039]  [0.099] [0.044] 
             
Index of Democracy  -0.085***  -0.025*  0.0004  -0.011  -0.074*** 0.013** 
[0.007]  [0.014]  [0.005]  [0.012]  [0.017] [0.006] 
             
Years of Democratic Stability  -0.066***  -0.121***  -0.119***  -0.004  0.116** -0.191*** 
[0.007]  [0.016]  [0.005]  [0.036]  [0.052] [0.041] 
             
Constant  -0.23  -5.104***  -4.019***  -3.305*  -24.751*** -2.416 
[0.361]  [0.601]  [0.321]  [1.778]  [2.984] [1.539] 
             
Adjusted R-squared  0.44  0.31  0.47  0.32  0.69 0.11 
Observations  1910  664  3584  1910  664 3584  
 
37
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%*. Robust standard errors are in brackets. 
Estimations for OLS include dummies for socialist and formerly socialist economies as well as site characteristic 
dummies for air pollutants (city center, other urban, rural, and traffic) and water pollutants (groundwater, lake, river, 




  Pollution Estimates using Random Site Effects (RSE) and Hausman-Taylor Random Site 
Effects (HTRE) 
 RSE  HTRE 
  Air Water Air Water 
 
Log SO2 Log  Lead  Log 
BOD  
Log SO2 Log  Lead  Log 
BOD 
 
Log Share of expenditures in 
public goods (as %  of total 











[0.061]  [0.123]  [0.031]  [0.072]  [0.123] [0.029] 
             
Log Total  government cons 
exp over GDP lagged         
-0.167  -0.324  0.056  -0.037  -0.073 0.138 
[0.165]  [0.277]  [0.123]  [0.133]  [0.265]  [0.156] 
             
Log of total Investment over  
GDP lagged   
0.117  -0.413**  -0.239***  0.247***  -0.004 -0.239*** 
[0.090]  [0.167]  [0.071]  [0.082]  [0.181]  [0.082] 
             
Log Household final 
consumption expenditure per 
capita  (2000 US$) average of 
current and previous two 











[0.056]  [0.105]  [0.048]  [0.089]  [0.304] [0.066] 
             
Log Total GDP (2000 US$) 
over  land area (sq. km) 
0.198***  -0.044  0.324***  0.281***  0.459** 0.356*** 
[0.042]  [0.057]  [0.034]  [0.074]  [0.232]  [0.048] 
             
Growth rate of GDP   0.894***  0.865  -0.811**  1.089***  1.365** -0.756** 
[0.323]  [0.606]  [0.338]  [0.290]  [0.605] [0.305] 
             
Trade openness Index   0.0004  0.003  0.007***  0.0005  0.011*** 0.006*** 
[0.001]  [0.002]  [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.003] [0.001] 
             
Dummy Freedom of Press  -0.263***  -0.216**  0.084**  -0.206***  -0.152* 0.092** 
[0.039]  [0.093]  [0.038]  [0.036]  [0.082] [0.039] 
             
Index of Democracy  -0.026***  -0.054***  0.007  -0.018*  -0.075*** 0.010* 
[0.008]  [0.013]  [0.005]  [0.009]  [0.016] [0.006] 
             
Years of Democratic Stability  -0.071***  -0.100***  -0.118***  -0.053**  0.022 -0.144*** 
[0.013]  [0.024]  [0.011]  [0.021]  [0.045] [0.016] 
             
Hausman Test (P-value)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.952  - - 
Adjusted R-squared  0.41  0.26  0.45     
Observations  1910 664 3584  1910 664 3584 
No. of Sites  292 123 488  292 123 488 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%*. Robust standard errors are in brackets for 
RSE. Both sets of estimations include common year dummies as well as site characteristic dummies for air  
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pollutants (city center, other urban, rural, and traffic) and water pollutants (groundwater, lake, river, and water 
temperature). HTRE uses the mean and deviation from the mean of all variables except expenditures in public goods 
as instruments in the estimation. The Hausman tests for HTRE using lead and BOD yield a negative test statistic.  
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Table III   
ACA Robustness Checks for the Coefficients of the Share of Public Goods and of total Government Spending 
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Log of level of 
Population between 
15 and 64  















Human Capital and 
Income Distribution 
Initial Income Gini 


















Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Data for the additional covariates used are available from the authors.   
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Table IV  
Robustness Check of the effect of share of expenditures in Public Goods and Total government 
spending on pollution: TVC vs Fixed country effects 
 
  Fixed Country Effects  TVC: Variable Country-specific 
Effects  
 Air  Water  Air Water 
  Log SO2 Log  Lead  Log 
BOD  
Log SO2 Log  Lead  Log 
BOD 
Log Share of expenditures in 
public goods (as %  of total 













[0.097]  [0.115]  [0.042]  [0.334] [0.414] [0.068] 
 
Log Log Total government 
consumptions exp over GDP 
lagged  













[0.175]  [0.341]  [0.177]  [0.451] [0.524] [0.245] 
 















[0.102]  [0.245]  [0.0846]  [0.313] [0.314] [0.166] 
Log Household final consumption  
expenditure  per capita  (2000 
US$) average of current and 













[0.364]  [1.011]  [0.198]  [0.099] [0.161]  [0.0570] 
 
Log Total GDP (2000 US$) over 













[0.288]  [0.763]  [0.141]  [0.061] [0.067] [0.036] 
 













[0.398]  [1.224]  [0.327]  [2.841] [4.442] [1.179] 
 













[0.002]  [0.004]  [0.001]  [0.003] [0.004] [0.001] 
 













[0.038]  [0.116]  [0.042]  [0.384] [1.143] [0.187] 
 













[0.017]  [0.017]  [0.006]  [0.036] [0.087] [0.014] 
 













[0.027]  [0.051]  [0.031]  [0.021] [0.035] [0.017] 
         
 
   
LR test for Country-Year 
Dummies 
      0.000  0.000 0.000 
Adjusted R Squared 0.69  0.72  0.52  0.57  0.51 0.49 
Number of Observations  1910  664  3584  1910  664 3584  
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Number of sites  292  123  488  292  123 488 
 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%*. Robust standard errors are in brackets. 
Estimates also include site characteristic dummies for air pollutants (city center, other urban, rural, and traffic) and 
water pollutants (groundwater, lake, river, and water temperature). LR tests the null hypothesis that the country fixed 
effects estimator is valid.  
 
Table V 
Dominance Tests of the estimates on the effect of share of Government Expenditure in Public 
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TABLE VI:  





 Air  Water 
 Log  SO2  Log Lead  Log BOD  
 
Log Share of expenditures in public goods excludes 
Social Welfare (as %  of total government exp) 
lagged 
 
-0.217*** -0.111  -0.232*** 
[0.060]  [0.129] 
[0.067] 
       
Log Total  government cons exp over GDP lagged       -0.216  -0.489*  0.024 
[0.172]  [0.264]  [0.131] 
       
Log of total Investment over  GDP lagged    0.084  -0.606***  -0.232*** 
[0.095]  [0.184]  [0.074] 
       
Log Household final consumption expenditure per 
capita  (2000 US$) average of current and previous 
two years    
-0.138**  0.187*  -0.205*** 
[0.058]  [0.102]  [0.049] 
       
Log Total GDP (2000 US$) over  land area (sq. km)  0.212***  -0.033  0.338*** 
[0.043]  [0.054]  [0.037] 
       
Growth rate of GDP   1.053***  0.671  -1.434*** 
[0.337]  [0.636]  [0.354] 
       
Trade openness Index   0.00002  0.001  0.007*** 
[0.001]  [0.002]  [0.001] 
       
Dummy Freedom of Press  -0.265***  -0.273***  0.084** 
[0.040]  [0.094]  [0.038] 
       
Index of Democracy  -0.037***  -0.074***  0.006 
[0.008]  [0.013]  [0.005] 
       
Years of Democratic Stability  -0.066***  -0.093***  -0.110*** 
[0.013]  [0.024]  [0.012] 
       
Hausman Test (P-value)  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Adjusted R-squared  0.37  0.25  0.46 
Observations  1863 642  3584 
No. of Sites  284 123  488 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%*. Robust standard errors are in brackets for 
RSE. Both sets of estimations include common year dummies as well as site characteristic dummies for air pollutants 









Robustness Checks with Added  Political Constraints and Regime Change. 
 
 RSE 
 Air  Water 
 Log  SO2  Log Lead  Log BOD  
 
Log Share of expenditures in public goods (as %  of 
total government exp) lagged 
 
-0.441*** -0.705***  -0.076*** 
[0.063]  [0.127]  [0.027] 
       
Log Total  government cons exp over GDP lagged       -0.164  -0.369  -0.238* 
[0.167]  [0.278]  [0.127] 
       
Log of total Investment over  GDP lagged    0.121  -0.447***  -0.217*** 
[0.091]  [0.170]  [0.067] 
       
Log Household final consumption expenditure per 
capita  (2000 US$) average of current and previous 
two years    
-0.061  0.278***  -0.145*** 
[0.056]  [0.105]  [0.052] 
       
Log Total GDP (2000 US$) over  land area (sq. km)  0.197***  -0.055  0.258*** 
[0.043]  [0.056]  [0.031] 
       
Growth rate of GDP   0.903***  0.818  -0.746** 
[0.325]  [0.607]  [0.332] 
       
Trade openness Index   0.001  0.003  0.006*** 
[0.001]  [0.002]  [0.001] 
       
Dummy Freedom of Press  -0.268***  -0.201**  0.064 
[0.039]  [0.095]  [0.040] 
       
Index of Democracy  -0.026***  -0.067***  0.002 
[0.009]  [0.016]  [0.009] 
       
Years of Democratic Stability  -0.071***  -0.114***  -0.125*** 
[0.013]  [0.027]  [0.010] 
   
  
 
Political Constraint V  -0.054 -0.013  0.12 
  [0.126] [0.203]  [0.099] 
      
Regime Change  -0.037 -0.355  -0.088 
  [0.185] [0.275]  [0.104] 
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Hausman Test (P-value)  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Adjusted R-squared  0.40  0.27  0.47 
Observations  1910 664  3443 
No. of Sites  292 123  484 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%*. Robust standard errors are in brackets for 
RSE. Both sets of estimations include common year dummies as well as site characteristic dummies for air pollutants 
(city center, other urban, rural, and traffic) and water pollutants (groundwater, lake, river, and water temperature). 
 
TABLE VIII 
Robustness Checks with Index of Globalization  
 
  RSE 
 Air  Water 
 Log  SO2  Log Lead  Log BOD  
 
Log Share of expenditures in public goods (as %  of 
total government exp) lagged 
 
-0.441*** -0.765***  -0.222*** 
[0.061]  [0.123]  [0.031] 
       
Log Total  government cons exp over GDP lagged       -0.178  -0.304  0.262** 
[0.163]  [0.281]  [0.132] 
       
Log of total Investment over  GDP lagged    0.096  -0.415**  -0.234*** 
[0.091]  [0.165]  [0.072] 
       
Log Household final consumption expenditure per 
capita  (2000 US$) average of current and previous 
two years    
-0.068  0.292***  -0.201*** 
[0.055]  [0.104]  [0.048] 
       
Log Total GDP (2000 US$) over  land area (sq. km)  0.196***  -0.082  0.445*** 
[0.039]  [0.055]  [0.032] 
       
Growth rate of GDP   0.883***  0.915  -0.712** 
[0.319]  [0.601]  [0.336] 
       
KOF Index of Globalization   0.004  -0.014  -0.014*** 
[0.006]  [0.010]  [0.005] 
       
Dummy Freedom of Press  -0.269***  -0.211**  0.055 
[0.039]  [0.092]  [0.038] 
       
Index of Democracy  -0.028***  -0.049***  0.007 
[0.008]  [0.013]  [0.005] 
       
Years of Democratic Stability  -0.072***  -0.103***  -0.135*** 
[0.012]  [0.024]  [0.012] 
       
Hausman Test (P-value)  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Adjusted R-squared  0.41  0.28  0.43 
Observations  1910 664  3584  
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No. of Sites  292 123  488 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%*. Robust standard errors are in brackets for 
RSE. Both sets of estimations include common year dummies as well as site characteristic dummies for air pollutants 







TABLE IX: Robustness Check with Dynamic Panel Estimation using GMM. 
 RSE 
 Air  Water 
 Log  SO2  Log Lead  Log BOD  
 
Log Share of expenditures in public goods (as %  of 
total government exp) lagged 
 
-0.243** -0.454***  -0.212** 
[0.110]  [0.159]  [0.093] 
       
Log Total  government cons exp over GDP lagged       0.702***  -0.089  0.396 
[0.195]  [0.364]  [0.289] 
       
Log of total Investment over  GDP lagged    -0.107  -0.092  0.285** 
[0.116]  [0.214]  [0.126] 
       
Log Household final consumption expenditure per 
capita  (2000 US$) average of current and previous 
two years    
-1.011**  0.283  -2.923*** 
[0.515]  [0.897]  [0.443] 
       
Log Total GDP (2000 US$) over  land area (sq. km)  1.294***  1.126  1.281*** 
[0.408]  [0.751]  [0.322] 
       
Growth rate of GDP   -0.153  0.391  -1.884*** 
[0.479]  [1.015]  [0.440] 
       
Trade openness Index   -0.002  0.005  0.006*** 
[0.002]  [0.004]  [0.002] 
       
Dummy Freedom of Press  -0.094*  -0.042  0.253** 
[0.050]  [0.097]  [0.119] 
       
Index of Democracy  0.005  -0.056***  0.005 
[0.018]  [0.017]  [0.009] 
       
Years of Democratic Stability  0.053  0.059  -0.423*** 
[0.051]  [0.052]  [0.056] 
      
 
Lag of ln(SO2)  
0.234*** 
[0.053] 
    
      
   0.243***   
Lag of ln(Lead)   [0.065]   
      
     0.175*** 
Lag of ln(BOD)     [0.034] 
      
       
Hansen Test  (P-value)  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Observations  1377 458  2775  
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No. of Sites  261 98  432 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%*. Robust standard errors are in brackets for 
RSE. Both sets of estimations include common year dummies as well as site characteristic dummies for air pollutants 





Table AI.  
Measures of Elasticity of Marginal Utility of Consumption or Income 
 
 Study  Elasticity  of 












studied and year 
period 
 
1 Layard  (2008)    1.26  Not 
indicated 





2 Evans  (2005)  1.4  Not 
indicated 
1.21-1.51  1.15-1.45 20  OECD 
countries 




3   Kula (2004)  1.64  Not 
indicated 
Not indicated none  India  
(1965-1995) 
4  Lopez (2008)  1.5  Not 
indicated 
Not indicated  none  9 Latin American 
Countries (has 
the estimates for 
each individual 
country) 





Not indicated none  Italy 






Not indicated  1.89  USA and Canada 




Not indicated none 19  EU  countries 
8  Cowell and Gardiner, 1999  1.41 (income tax 
only) 
1.28 (Tax +NICs) 
Not 
indicated 
Not indicated none  UK  (1999-2000) 
9  Evans and Sezer, 2004  Ranges from 1.4 to 
1.7 across countries 
Not 
indicated 




US, UK   
10  Evans (2004)  1.35  Not 
indicated 
Not indicated none  France 
11  Azar (2007)  4.5  Not 
indicated 
Not indicated 4.5  USA 
12  Stern (1977)  1.97       UK  (1973-1974) 
13  Mera (1969, pg 469)  1.5      1.5 US  (1948-1965) 
14  Blundell et al., 1994  1.20-1.40 
0.35-1.05 (this last 
estimate is because a 
dummy was used in 
1980s to capture 
     UK  (1970-86)  
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high interest rate) 
15  Pearce and Ulph (1995)  0.8-0.9       U K 
16  Barsky et al., 1995  4.2      4.2 US  middle  aged 
ages 51- 61 (1992) 
17  Brown and Deaton (1972, pg 1206)  2.8       UK  (1900-1970) 
18  Kula (1985)  0.71       U K 
19  Amiel et al., 1999  0.2-0.8       Student  surveys 
in Australia and 
Israel 
            
  EXPERT OPINIONS           
20 Eckstein  (1958)  0.5-2.0       USA 
21 Feldstein  (1965)  1.0-2.0       USA 
22 Cline  (1993)  1.5       USA 
23  Boscolo et. al. (1998)  1.0-2.0       USA 
24 Arrow  (1995)  1.5-2.0       USA 
25  Scott (1977, 1989)  1.5       U K 
26  Little and Mirrlees (1974)  1.0-3.0       U K 






Table AII  
Sources of Air Pollutants (%), 2002  










(Includes Electricity Generation and 
Industrial Process) 
80 3 56  27 9 
Consumption sources  
(Includes Road Vehicles and Residential 
Wood Combustion) 
2 60 0 38  30 
Both production and consumption  
(Includes Fuel Combustion, Non Road 
Equipment, Solvent Use, Fires, Waste 
Disposal and Miscellaneous) 
18 37 44 34 61 
Note: Figures are in percentage distribution. 





















Table AIII  
Summary Statistics of the Data Used in Regressions 
 
Variables Mean  Std.  Dev  Min  Max 
Share of public goods (as %  of 
total government expenditure) 
0.54 0.15 0.21 0.88 
 






















Household final consumption  
expenditure  per capita  (2000 
US$) moving average of current 
and previous two years   
5,380 5,296  158 22,223 
 




















































 Table AIV   
Description of Variables 
Variable Description  Years 
Available 
Source 
Sulfur Dioxide (SO2)  SO2 concentration, micrograms per cubic 
meter 













Quantity of oxygen necessary for 
biological and chemical oxidation of water-








expenditure  per 
capita  (2000 US$)       
(3 year moving 
average)                 
 
Household final consumption expenditure 
(formerly private consumption) is the 
market value of all goods and services, 
including durable products (such as cars, 
washing machines, and home computers), 
purchased by households. It excludes 
purchases of dwellings but includes 
imputed rent for owner-occupied 
dwellings. It also includes payments and 
fees to governments to obtain permits and 
licenses. Here, household consumption 
expenditure includes the expenditures of 
nonprofit institutions serving households, 









GDP growth (2000 
US$)    
Real GDP per Capita growth (Constant 
US$ 2000) 
 
1980 – 2004  World Development 
Indicators (World 
Bank) 
Share of Government 
Expenditure in Public 
Goods 
This is the share of government 
expenditure on public goods. Public goods 
are defined as a total of Public Goods is 




iii) Social security 
iv) Transport 
v)  Communication 
vi) Public order and safety 
vii) Housing and community amenities 
viii) Environmental Protection 
ix) Religion and Culture 
 
1980 – 2004  Government Financial 




Level of government: 
Consolidated central 
government is the level 













Trade  Openness  Sati index which is the residual of the 
regression of Trade on population, area, 
gdp per capita, dummy for industrialized 
country, dummy for oil exporter, and 
imports over export prices. A positive 
residual implies a more open economy 
 
1980-2001 Pritchett,  Lant.  1996. 
Updated by López and 
Galinato [2007] 
 





Investment over GDP 
 
Foreign direct investment are the net 
inflows of investment to acquire a lasting 
management interest (10 percent or more 
of voting stock) in an enterprise operating 
in an economy other than that of the 
investor. It is the sum of equity capital, 
reinvestment of earnings, other long-term 
capital, and short-term capital as shown in 
the balance of payments. This series shows 
net inflows in the reporting economy and 













1980 – 2004 
 
Penn World Tables 
[2006]  
 
Share of Investment 
over GDP 
  
1980 – 2004 
 
Penn World Tables 
[2006] 
 
Index of Democracy 
 








Years of Democratic 
Stability 
 





From Polity IV and 
updated to 2005 
www.cidcm.umd.edu 
 
Dummy Freedom of 
Press 
 







Political Constraint V 
 
This index measures the feasibility of 
policy change, i.e. the extent to which a 
change 
in the preferences of any one political 




Henisz [2000]  
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policy. The index scores are derived from a 
simple spatial model and theoretically 
ranges from 0 to 1, with higher scores 
indicating more political constraint and 




Coded 0 if democracy; 1 if dictatorship. A 
regime is considered a dictatorship if the 
chief executive is not elected, the 
legislature is not elected, there is no more 
than one party, or there has been no 
alternation in power. Transition years are 





Cheibub and Gandhi 
[2004] 
 
KOF Index of 
Globalization 
 
Index of globalization considers three 
main sub-indices: (i) Index of economic 
integration (actual flows: e.g. trade, FDI, 
restrictions: e.g. mean tariff trade, taxes on 
international trade ) (ii) Index of political 
integration (embassies in country, 
membership in international 
organizations) (iii) Index of social 
integration (Personal Contact: e.g. 
outgoing telephone traffic, foreign 
population, Information Flows: e.g. daily 
newspapers, radios, telephone mainlines, 
Cultural Proximity: e.g. No. of 
McDonald’s restaurants per capita. Higher 







      
Note: Data for additional covariates are available from the authors. 
 
 
COUNTRY LIST OF POLLUTION DATA AVAILABILITY 
 
Countries with Air Pollution Data: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Canada, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, India, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico, New Zealand, Philippines, Portugal, 
Republic of Korea, Romania, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, United 
Kingdom, United States, Uruguay.  
 
Countries with Water Quality Data 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, 
Denmark, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Iran, 
Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, 
Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, United States, United Kingdom, Uruguay 